Powers behind control: An essay on democracy by Hupe, P.L. (Peter)
ROUGH OUTLINE FOR A PAPER. COMMENTS ARE WELCOME. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Powers behind control: An essay on democracy 
 
Peter L. Hupe 
 
 
 
Department of Public Administration 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
hupe@fsw.eur.nl 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To be presented at the Annual Work Conference of the  
Netherlands Institute of Government,  
held at Erasmus University Rotterdam, October 29, 2004 
Workshop 3: Institutional Rearrangement of the Public Domain 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
Abstract 
 
In contemporary Western democracies the role of government is not what it used to 
be. In the public discourse some authors claim to observe a ‘relocation of politics’, 
while others speak of a ‘democratic deficit’ in general. In this essay the relationship 
between democracy and governance is explored on a macro-level. The argument is 
that performance in the public domain and the decisions underlying it no longer in a 
direct way can be traced down to expressions of societal demands. This is because 
both the relationships between society and democracy and between politics and 
performance have become looser. In particular, the hierarchical relation between 
democracy and government has been replaced by a more horizontal pairing of 
democracy and governance. As the latter has multiple dimensions, entailing a range of 
activities performed at various spots by a variety of actors, it appears that democracy, 
as well, cannot appropriately get substance and form in a singular way anymore. 
Enhancing the visibility of who is involved in the processes leading to public 
decisions, combined with enlarging possibilities for accountability, ‘multi-
localisation’ provides a conceptual perspective for rethinking contemporary 
democracy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There once was a time in which the representative organs of democracy were seen as 
firmly anchored in society. In and around these organs, politics functioned as the 
intermediary process between society and government. The realisation of the 
collective goals agreed upon was taken care of by political authorities guiding public 
administration. 
 
Of course this has always been a fairytale. Now, as a mirror image rather a horror 
scenario sets the tone. In many Western democracies the voting turn out has declined 
more or less dramatically (Andeweg and Irwin, 2002). Politics is said to be in crisis. 
The traditional political institutions lack the societal support they used to have. In the 
news media the leadership qualities of modern statesmen are criticised. According to 
contemporary observers the state itself has become ‘virtual’ (Rosecrance, 1996; 
Frissen, 1996, 1999a) or even ‘empty’ (Frissen, 1999b).  
 
In this context one of the great issues in the present Western world is what is 
circumscribed as the ‘democratic deficit’. At a general level this notion seems to refer 
to a shortage of legitimacy in society for what the Executive Power is doing. But in 
more concrete terms it largely remains unclear what is the nature of the problem. 
Solutions propagated to address the deficit, such as referendums, therefore 
particularly seem to be political claims. Objective of this essay is twofold: assessing 
the characteristics of the perceived democratic deficit and, after that, identifying some 
principles that may be helpful to address that deficit. 
 
In the second section developments related to the perceived problem are explored. 
Next, the relocation of power and some ways addressing that phenomenon are 
exposed (third section). In the fourth section the problem of the democratic deficit is 
restated; accordingly a few principles are identified from which the restated problem 
can be addressed. Finally conclusions are drawn (fifth section).     
 
 
2. Postmodernity and beyond 
 
When one wants to position the perception of the problem of a democratic deficit as 
well as its backgrounds, it seems sensible to make observations beyond election 
results and voting turnouts. Contemporary observers have been trying to capture the 
Zeitgeist around the beginning of the third millennium in various catchy concepts, if 
possible turning them in best-selling monographies.  Looking at the literature 
produces the sight of a range of publications with a varying background: social 
science, journalism, and novel writing. Without a claim of presenting an exhaustive 
overview here, a distinction between economical, managerial, sociological, and 
politics and state focused arguments can be made. A special category is the meta-
trends. 
 
The globalisation of markets of products and capital flows is the generally accepted 
notion stemming from economically oriented essays on contemporary developments.  
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Goods move all over the world, while money is transferred from behind a computer 
screen. Observing global financial integration makes O’Brien (1992) speak of ‘the 
end of geography’. In the traditional division of economic sectors the commercial 
delivery of information-related services has been booming. The number of sorts of 
communication media has grown, while their impact on the lives of the mass public 
has become almost unlimited (Gitlin, 2002). The continuous supply of fun and events 
via such media and of entertainment in general, has become an industry. It makes 
people behave like actors in the film of their own lives, or even as the directors of it 
(Gabler, 1998). Thus an entire ‘entertainment economy’ has arisen (Wolf, 1999). 
   
The first to discover the meaning of image in modern society was Daniel Boorstin 
(1962). It was him and Marshall McLuhan (1962) stating that the medium was the 
message who, in fact, conceptualised the possibilities of the commercial use of 
communications technology. Later, Ritzer with his notion of the ‘McDonaldization of 
society’ (19PM) showed the functionality of a modular organisational design as a 
management tool.  
 
A specific category of exposes about contemporary developments is the one focusing 
at the meta-level of trends with a trans-global range. The notion of the ‘global village’ 
(McLuhan, 1962?; Bauman, 1998) is one of the relatively oldest. The so-called 
electronic highway, nowadays called the Internet, has literally connected the lives of 
people to people living at the other side of the world.  Frissen (1999a) distinguishes 
‘transformations’ that can be observed on a world scale: horizontalisation, 
autonomisation, deterritorialisation, and virtualisation. Earlier, Naisbitt and Aburdene 
presented ten ‘mega-trends’ visible with an universal scope (1990). They mentioned 
the changes from an industrial towards an information society; from imposed 
technology towards technology processing; from a national economy towards a global 
economy; form a short term orientation towards a long term orientation; from 
centralisation towards power sharing; from assistance towards self help; from 
representative democracy towards direct democracy; from hierarchies towards 
networks; from north towards south; and from limited choice towards multiple 
choices (Naisbitt and Aburdene, 1990).   
 
While surfing on the world wide web and permanently connected with their mobile 
phones especially younger people have got used to make many choices in a short time 
and select what they think is useful for the moment. At school the ‘Googlification of 
education’ may lead to the ‘Googlification of knowledge’ (Vanheste, 2004). This 
eclectic kind of behaviour can be observed in other domains of life as well. In the 
category of broad views with a sociological character the notion of a ‘network 
society’ in the ‘information age’ has been widespread (Castells, 1998). Traditional 
social bonds have lost much of their relevance. Modern citizens act primarily as 
consumers of goods and services on a market and are addressed correspondingly. The 
hierarchical influence of Great Institutions as the state, the church, and the father has 
diminished. Especially the younger generations are seen as having a more cynical 
attitude towards life: not only goods but also social relations are consummated in a 
random way (see Douglas Copland’s Generation X, 19PM). The habitus of shopping 
has becoming a general way of approaching one’s existence (Fortuin, 2000). 
Particularly younger people are zapping themselves through life. The ‘copy-paste 
generation’, born after 1985, has been raised in a world stuffed with electronics and is 
used to copying, deleting and replying. Younger people select what they prefer and 
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thus compose not only their own outfit and compact discs but their entire lives (Van 
der Velden, 2004).  
 
Also the older generations, however, are not what they used to be. Continuous 
economic growth after the Second World War has resulted in a higher general level of 
prosperity, a higher general level of education, a better health and a longer life 
expectation for many. The number of well to do ‘senior citizens’ with a good pension 
and much leisure time has risen, enhancing an entire categorical entertainment 
industry with a huge marketing potential. In the age segment below that, people in 
their early fifties, ‘self-actualisation is what educated existence is all about’ (Brooks, 
2000, p. 18).  ‘Bourgeois bohemians’ combine the material wealth they enjoy with the 
Romantic ideal of artistic self-expression: in their Sports Utility Vehicle they drive to 
their yoga lessons. As such they can be seen as the new upper class (Brooks, 2000). 
They, but they not only, enjoy a relatively stable existence that produces a limited sets 
of excitements and accordingly a chronical, slumbering feeling of discontentment.  
Therefore constantly new thrills are sought, though within a controlled setting. 
Boutellier (2002) speaks of the ‘culture of the bungee jumper’, seeking a utopia of 
safety. 
 
Seemingly more directly related to the democratic deficit are the treatises about the 
contemporary state of politics and the politics of the contemporary state. After the fall 
of the Berlin Wall Fukuyama (1992) could write about the perceived ideological 
victory of liberal democracy. Guehenno (1993, p. 8) stated: ‘The year 1989 marks the 
end of the are of the nation-states’ (see also Ohmae, 1995). In this postmodern 
condition not only the end of history could be proclaimed, but the raison d’etat 
literally had ceased to exist, it seemed. The state was said to be ‘virtual’ or even 
‘empty’ and could afford it merely to be so (Rosecrance, 1996; Frissen, 1999a, 
1999b). But, again, the times were changing soon already. Creveld (1996), military 
historian, warned that the claim of the state for it’s monopoly of the use of violence 
was contested by small, radical groups and this would be more so in the near future.     
 
Though far from comprehensive, this overview of arguments about ‘universal’ trends 
provides a background for our focussing on the democratic deficit. At stake in these 
arguments are various ways of Zeitgeist-watching. Most of the contributions are eye 
opening, often well written and certainly inviting for reflection. Sometimes they are 
based on data, but not always is explicitly made clear in which way these data are 
used as evidence and empirical basis for the argument. Catching the broad lines about 
phenomena perceived as contemporary trends seems what authors here are aiming at, 
rather than, for instance, middle-range theory formation and the ceteris paribus testing 
of hypotheses. In some cases this means that, obviously, at least the evidence is 
contradictory. On a world scale, the proclaimed end of the nation-state, for instance, 
rather seems a political claim than that it is unambiguously proved on the basis of 
empirical evidence. The importance of regional economies, opposite of 
‘globalisation’, and the pushing power of certain nation states behind it makes Weiss 
on the basis of empirical research speak of the ‘myth of the powerless state’ (Weiss, 
1998). Another idea, generally accepted in certain member-countries of the European 
Union, is that ‘Brussels’ produces many new rules and regulations for the nation 
states.  Both De Jong and Herweijer (2004) and Bovens and Yesilkagit (2004) prove 
empirically that the influence of the EU administration on the level of regulations is 
less than usually expected. Though the findings of these two researches about the 
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number of new rules and regulations in a country like The Netherlands stemming 
from policy decisions in the European Union differ, they underline the ambiguity of 
data on the idea of great “Brussels’ influence”. It is this ambiguity that makes Van 
Schendelen (2004) warn for replacing one myth by another.  
 
Yet, even a fiction may fulfil functions. Therefore it particularly is worthwhile to 
explore the idea that power has fled away from national government more in detail, as 
well as some remedies presented for that ‘relocation of power’.   
 
 
3. The empty looks of the centre 
 
 
The relocation of politics (Bovens et al., 1995)  
 
In 1995 the think tank of the Dutch Labour Party published a 61 pages report called 
‘The relocation of politics’. In this ‘pamphlet’ (p. 11) Mark Bovens and four co-
authors wanted to give a description of the contemporary problems of democracy. 
They argue that there still is a democratic deficit, but not as much in ‘The Hague’: 
political power and political struggle partly have moved to elsewhere. ‘More than 
ever the debate and decision making about important developments in society take 
place outside the traditional arenas: in the main offices of large international 
corporations; within consultation organs and during negotiations between civil 
servants; in the corridors of European and other supra-national organizations; in the 
national and international courts; in research departments, hospitals, and laboratories’ 
(p. 13 – translation PH). The authors identify six directions of the relocation of 
politics away from Westminster or the Binnenhof.  Internationalisation means that 
many decision-making and rule making has been relocated towards the European 
Union. ‘The relocation of political power, as far as Europe is concerned, not yet has 
led to a proportional relocation of political accountability and control’ (p. 14). 
Regionalism implies an ongoing decentralisation of tasks towards local government. 
Bureaucratisation means that Cabinet members more and more come into play in the 
end stage of the political process: a relocation towards intra-civil service committees 
has taken place. Growing technocracy, a relocation of power towards organisations in 
society, implies, for instance, that actors without an explicit mandate and on grounds 
that are unclear often make decisions about environmental and safety risks. 
Individualisation refers to the emancipation of citizens in their relations with 
institutions: the relocation towards the private domain. Expanding juridicracy, finally, 
means the relocation of politics towards the Judicial Power.  
 
Bovens et al. observe a loss of relevance of the traditional, representative organs, 
which may even lead to an undermining of the democratic Rechtsstaat. They confront 
these developments with two normative principles that they call social-democratic. 
The first one is that the exercise of power has to go along with accountability. The 
second principle is that the exercise of power should not be restricted to a social elite. 
Power sharing and the protection of those without social power therefore are seen as 
an essential element of the social character of the Rechtsstaat. Confronting reality 
with the latter two normative principles produces a problem then, because ‘the 
relocation of politics in many cases particularly entails a relocation of societal power; 
rather than, or not yet, a relocation of democratic control’ (p. 21). What Bovens et al. 
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call the ‘problem of the many hands’ here means that in the public domain many 
organisations are active and also a variety of actors is involved in policy processes. 
This situation makes it very difficult for citizens and other outsiders to state ‘who to 
which extent can be addressed about the outcomes’ (p. 22). 
 
The authors see three strategies to deal with this situation. They speak of the 
‘parliamentary-democratic way’, the possibility of the democratisation of other 
societal arenas, and the creation of new forms of public debate and decision-making. 
As far as the latter is concerned Bovens et al. refer to the concept of ‘horizontal 
governance’ in which government and parliament on the one hand and private 
organisations on the other are living apart together and practise partnership (Huyse, w. 
y.). 
 
Despite of the formal status of the report the notion of the relocation of (in fact) power 
as introduced by Bovens and his co-authors has been quite influential in the public 
discourse about politics and administration in the Netherlands. And also the remedy 
they propagate with their three ‘strategies for ‘democratic renewal’ can be traced in 
the follow up of that discourse. Without any claim on exhaustiveness three later 
publications can be addressed here, each of which in its own way, actually, presents 
an elaboration of the three strategies, in the order presented. 
 
 
Back to the political centre (the Kohnstamm Committee, 2004) 
 
The present Balkenende Cabinet in The Netherlands in 2003 asked a committee 
formed around Jacob Kohnstamm, former deputy minister of the Interior, to give 
advice how to deal with so called quasi-autonomised organisations (quango’s). Main 
conclusion of the Committee is that the expectations in the past years aimed at with 
the autonomisation of government tasks have not been realised. ‘The problems have 
become greater because it was not a well-circumscribed task but especially the 
organisation that was placed at a distance. This has led to the structurally returning 
discussion: “Is this something the minister has formal competence about, or not?’ 
(Kohnstamm Report, 2004, p. 6 – translation PH).  
 
The Committee states that the Dutch state system is based on the principle of no 
authority exercised without accountability. This means that all exercise of power goes 
hand in hand with holding oneself accountable: authorities always are to be addressed 
for what they do and not do. Confronted with the empirical situation sketched above, 
on the basis of this principle the Committee pleads for a restoration of the primacy of 
ministerial responsibility. Again it must become possible for Parliament to hold 
members of the Cabinet accountable for the way in which tasks belonging to 
government are being fulfilled. ‘It should not be necessary to maintain all 
autonomised organisations. In principle government must be able to fulfil government 
tasks within its own organisation’ (p. 8). ‘The founding or maintaining of a quasi-
autonomous organisation often is a proof of the inability of national government to let 
political control and the performance of public tasks go hand in hand’ (p. 9). To 
realise this – again new – situation a ‘turn around’ is necessary (p. 7).   
 
 
Ahead to the election of sectoral appointees (In ‘t Veld and Kruiter, 2002) 
 7
 
The present system of representative democracy is bankrupt, Roeland in ‘t Veld and 
Albert Jan Kruiter (2002) state in a substantive newspaper article. The present 
representative organs and their members lack any form of vitality. Modern citizens 
are at least as competent as their (formerly) ‘noble representative who provides 
surplus’. Internet enables direct communication as well as mass customisation. 
Besides, there no longer is a one-dimensional territorial basis. And, finally, because 
the value patterns of citizens have become fragmented, an overarching weighing of 
interests no longer is possible.  
 
So a radical form of democratic renewal is abolishing these organs and with that, the 
principle of representation itself. In the view of In ‘t Veld and Kruiter democracy 
without representation is a better alternative, because policy formation can take place 
in an interactive form, while no representatives are needed. Second, implementation 
requires checks and oversight, but no representation. And third, inspectors and market 
masters can be elected directly, while thus acceptable checks and balances are being 
created. In a situation of value fragmentation interactive policy making more 
acknowledges the characteristics of that situation than decision making via 
representation. In fields like education, care, police, the direct election of executive 
authorities may enhance political passion, In ‘t Veld and Kruiter claim. In this way 
not only implementation but also the external checks on it can be made 
democratically accountable. Only two layers then suffice for general representation. 
An elected General Audit checks the elected Cabinet. At the local layer the 
Committees of Mayor and Aldermen are directly elected, while the municipal council 
is abolished. The task of these single organs of general – opposite of 
functional/sectoral representation - is twofold: designing the functional relations 
between the various authorities, as well as fulfilling roles of process designer in 
interactive policy making (In ‘t Veld and Kruiter, 2002).    
 
 
The relocation of democracy (Van der Meer and Ham, 2001) 
 
When power has been relocated, then democracy immediately should follow; that is 
the leading notion in the book Jelle van der Meer and Marcel Ham wrote as a follow 
up of the publication of Bovens et al.. Journalists by profession, the authors have 
looked at recent developments in four policy domains: primary education, public 
housing, agriculture, and media.  ‘What in practice is actually happening with public 
interests when a specific policy sector is being placed at a distance of national 
government?’ (p. 9) In their concluding chapter Van der Meer and Ham observe three 
kinds of problems. First, it proves to be difficult for government actors to impose 
demands when one does not do the implementation oneself. The authors refer to the 
relation between city governments and housing associations that are addressed as 
‘hybrid organisations’ nowadays. Not doing the implementation means having no 
adequate floor knowledge and therefore being in the defensive. Second, the 
autonomised implementers want as much discretion as possible and they have a power 
basis to realise that. Third, there is a problem of measurement. ‘The need for control 
leads to imposing objectives which can be measured, and those not always are the 
(only) relevant objectives’ (p. 108). If vertical steering via hierarchy does not work, 
what can be done horizontally then, the authors ask. And can such democratically, 
that is: in a weighing of interests that is equitable and justifiable? 
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Van der Meer and Ham mention a few aspects of public accountability. Autonomy 
means particularly autonomy for the professionals involved. Therefore the building of 
countervailing powers is important, of users as well as employees. Organisations of 
parents, tenants and so on, can be built up locally but also supported at a regional or 
national level. But how to prevent that the public interest (good education) only is 
split up into particular interests (good education for my child)? Oversight and 
inspection remain necessary government tasks. And organising the legitimacy of these 
overseers seems a meta-task here. Furthermore, transparency by making yearly 
reports and publishing them and so on, is important. The specific forms this repertoire 
of creating countervailing powers of users and employers, the construction of 
inspection arrangements, and the improvement of transparency, may vary per sector. 
In the view of Van der Meer and Ham there is a remaining task for national 
government, however. First, the creation of, eventually legal, frameworks for these 
kinds of arrangements. Second, establishing consensus about more substantive points 
like objectives and criteria. These can be formulated within the sector itself, but are to 
be presented to (local) government. And third, the role of government is that of the 
final overseer who sees to it that the rules of the game remain being followed. 
Government may also point at forgotten and new interests and can intervene when 
power relationships are too unequal. In short, it is the ultimate task of government ‘to 
guarantee the democratic weighing of interests at a lower layer’ (Van der Meer and 
Ham, 2001, p. 113). Autonomisation thus not only means the relocation of 
implementation, but the spreading of democracy within the framework of the national 
system of political-societal relations. Requisite then is not as much continuous 
participation – which nowadays seems an unrealistic desideratum more than ever -, 
but rather the possibility of intervention.       
 
In the second and present sections of this paper the problem of the democratic deficit 
has been positioned in, respectively, its societal context and in the public discourse, 
finally focussing at ways of dealing with the relocation of power. Let us now try to 
restate the problem in such a way that its various dimensions as addressed in the 
particular contributions presented above can be seen as related to each other in a 
specific way. 
 
 
4. Democracy and governance  
 
The generally accepted view on democracy this paper began with, normatively 
anchored as it is, in fact implies a very particular view. The essence of this view is a 
triple hierarchy; a hierarchy which collides with (post)modern reality. The empirical 
undermining of the three-fold primacy to be sketched provides a key to understanding 
the perceived democratic deficit but also one to reflect on possibilities of overcoming 
it. 
 
 
Broken vertical connections 
 
First there is the relationship between Society, Politics, and Democracy (with capital 
letters, because the terms are used here in a metaphorical sense, on a macro-level). In 
the broadly spread view on liberal democracy legitimate power stems from the people 
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(Held, 2002). What members of Parliament or Congress come up with on behalf of 
the Common Good, what the Legislative Branch agrees upon to be done by the 
Executive Branch, is rooted in the problems as seen by the members of the polis. 
Politics is the designation for the process via which this translation takes place. The 
relationship between these Great Institutions fundamentally is one of agenda setting: 
what comes on the political agenda in the organs of democratic representation stems 
from society. Within this agenda setting stage summarised as ‘democracy’ (with a 
small letter) one could speak of the primacy of Society. 
 
Once the political agenda has been formulated, it is up to the institutions of the 
Executive Branch to produce the desired results. In particular the relation between 
Politics and Administration is involved here. As a follow up of the logically preceding 
agenda setting (‘democracy’) now the stage of policy making is present. Also this 
relationship fundamentally has a hierarchical character (Wilson, 1941; see also 
Frederickson and Smith, 2003). The hierarchy within this relationship summarised as 
‘government’ traditionally has been addressed as the primacy of Politics. 
 
In what can be seen now as, in fact, a stages model at a macro-level, there is a third 
and final hierarchy, namely between the agenda setting stage of democracy and the 
policy making stage of government. The general assumption used to be that 
democracy plus government leads to legitimate government performance, as a 
dependent variable. However, things seem to have changed now. 
 
In the traditional, or perhaps ‘modernist’ view on democracy the relationship between 
Society and performance in the general interest in fact always has been a hierarchical 
one: democracy has the primacy over government. Nowadays in the context of 
developments sketched above this linear, chain-like connection has been cut through 
at two spots. First, between Society and Politics: the lower voting turn outs and the 
diminishing involvement in party politics are seen as the major expression of a 
smaller basis of legitimacy of what politicians are doing. This is the essence of the so-
called democratic deficit in a narrow sense. Second, the connections between Politics 
and Performance have been cut or in any case made looser; that is the essence of what 
has been called the relocation of politics. What one can observe now is that 
government performance has become public performance, because ‘government’ has 
become ‘governance’, making often unclear who are the deciding actors and in which 
way they weigh interests. 
 
When thus the hierarchical chain between Society and Public Performance has been 
broken at two places, a legitimacy problem appears to arise.  The de facto collectively 
binding character of certain decisions made in the public domain stands opposite of 
the lack of explicit public weighing of collective interests as the basis for such 
decisions. Then the problem is twofold: Who are involved in these decision-making 
processes and which weighing of interests takes place? And next: On behalf of whom 
those actors participate and weigh? Together the problem is one of legitimacy. The 
dual problem appearing as, on the hand, a democratic deficit and, on the other, as the 
relocation of politics now can be restated. On the government side there is a shortage 
of visibility. If (central) government in policy processes no longer can be supposed to 
be the central and leading actor, who then are de facto governing actors and on which 
grounds do they make their decisions? On the agenda setting democracy side there is 
a problem of accountability: who is held accountable to whom? 
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If the replacement of government by governance forms an important aspect of this 
problem, in any case that of visibility, it may also provide ways to deal with the new 
situation. Or: when the relationship is no longer the hierarchical one between 
democracy and government, the relation between the former and governance, instead, 
- multiple horizontal and vertical as the concept of governance is – may supply ways 
for rethinking new forms of democracy. How would these look like and how the 
problem of visibility and accountability thus could be addressed?   
 
 
Multiple governance 
 
According to O’Toole (2000, p. 276) the concept of governance is designed ‘to 
incorporate a more complete understanding of the multiple levels of action and kinds 
of variables that can be expected to influence performance’. Conceptualising this 
performance in the public domain as governance has consequences. First, the focus is 
action, rather than government as institution. Who is the governing actor becomes an 
empirical question; it may be a public or a private one. Second, where the various 
actions takes place also is empirically open; differentiating between administrative 
layers and levels of action is important. Third, in the concept of governance the 
separation of policy from management has been abolished. Governance implies both, 
while the act of managing can be observed in all loci of political-societal relationships 
(Hill and Hupe, 2002).   
 
Taking their lead from Kiser and Ostrom’s (1982) ‘three worlds of action’ Hill and 
Hupe distinguish a structure-, content-, and process dimension of the concept of 
governance as a focus. Each of these refers to a broad set of related activities: those 
concerning institutional design, giving direction, and getting things done.  
Respectively, Hill and Hupe (2002) speak of constitutive, directive and operational 
governance. Different from the traditional ‘stages model’ each of these activity 
clusters can be observed at any administrative layer. Both the number of acting actors 
and of potential action situations can thought of as infinite. Categorizing the number 
of action situations Hill and Hupe speak in a summarising way of three loci in 
political-societal relations: the locus of the system, that of the organisation, and the 
locus of the individual. In fact, the vertical stages view on the policy process thus has 
been replaced by a multi-dimensional framework for the conceptualisation of the 
policy process as multiple governance.  In this conceptualisation governance 
essentially is both ‘mixed-focus’ and ‘multi-local’. Not only it involves giving 
direction (cf. the stage of policy formation), but also managing activities (cf. the stage 
of implementation) and even designing institutions, while each of these activity sets 
can take various forms according to the specific action situations (loci) in which they 
take place. What then may be the consequences for democracy? 
 
 
Multi-local democracy 
 
When the normative principles of the Rechtsstaat and democracy remain valid, but 
power, with more or less legitimacy, is being exercised at many places in the public 
domain, the consequences of the latter for the institutional position of democracy 
needs to be reflected on. In the third section of this paper three remedies for the 
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related problems of the relocation of power and the democratic deficit were presented. 
If they are assessed now – too quickly, that is certain - the functionality of the first 
remedy of returning to the centre, in the context of developments like the ones 
pictured can be disputed. The second remedy, a proposal to move ahead to the direct 
election of sectoral functionaries, appears to imply too much a breach with the 
traditions of liberal democracy yet. The third argument, called the relocation of 
democracy, points at relevant empirical phenomena. How do they relate to the 
perspective presented here? 
 
It seems that, for instance, the rise of professional associations not only of the 
traditional professions like medical doctors and lawyers but also of so called street-
level bureaucrats like police officers and social workers can be seen as a direct 
countervailing power – an essential institutional feature of liberal democracy – in the 
system-locus, opposite of and giving structure to random behaviour of single 
practitioners. The formulation of codes of conduct, certification procedures, citizen’s 
charters, etcetera also can be addressed as structure-oriented activities of governance 
taking place with consequences for systems (of police, social work, and so on) as a 
whole. The same goes for appeal procedures. Councils of parents at school, of clients 
of social services around a Municipal Social Services Department, of tenants around a 
housing association, of patients suffering from a specific disease; in general, forms of 
organising of users, customers, clients, or other direct stake holders, can be seen as 
institutions practising checks on the exercise of power as well, though in a different 
locus, that is the one of single organisations. There also organisation-bound complaint 
procedures can be localised. In the locus of inter-individual relations phenomena like 
peer review function as mechanisms limiting the uncontrolled exercise of power. 
Addressing the structural ‘democratic devices’ like the ones mentioned here enhances 
both the visibility and accountability side of the problem as restated above. 
 
Looking at the agricultural sector in the Netherlands Van der Meer and Ham (2001, p. 
68) propose the foundation of what they call regional ‘Public Agricultural Councils’. 
Participants would be farmers, environmental and nature preservation organisations, 
the Water Boards, Chambers of Commerce, groups of inhabitants, project developers, 
corporate industry, supermarkets, and etcetera. Government, both in The Hague and 
Brussels, then would be expected to formulate only minimum rules and granting a 
sum, leaving the regional Councils as mentioned the room to deal with one’s own 
affairs on a mutual basis. If such a ‘thought experiment’ (ibidem, p. 69) would 
become reality, its functioning as aimed for could be seen as giving direction in a 
specific sector/region context. In terms of the concept presented above we would be 
talking about the system-locus of the content-dimension of governance. Interactive 
policy making on specific subjects of a local character, for instance, can be addressed 
in the same category, though rather in the organisation locus. In the locus of inter-
individual interaction a phenomenon like giving a second opinion can be seen as a 
countervailing power towards the possibility of random decision making in the 
treatment of individual cases: directive governance ‘at the street-level’. 
 
With the third set of governance activities, called operational governance, the possible 
vertical and horizontal counter-pressures of the alternative spending of time, money, 
and personnel may be at stake. In the system-locus these pressures, for instance, may 
involve the choice between a form of project-management in a case of high priority 
versus regular attention for managing ‘normal’ policy processes. In the locus of the 
 12
organisation standard bureaucratic politics can enlighten the action choices related to 
managing inter-organisational relations. Clients expressing their rights or co-workers 
making alternative judgements at the work floor, in the locus of the individual may 
fulfil roles as checks towards the unlimited exercise of power.      
 
All these examples highlight that around the various dimensions of governance, 
practised as it is in different action situations, horizontal checks are working that have 
a restraining effect on the random use of public executive power. Of course, we are 
not used to call these checks ‘democracy’. Furthermore, it is obvious that these 
mechanisms cannot be traced down to a singular democratic institution. At the same 
time, they seem to fulfil functions similar to the ones democracy once was said to 
fulfil in the hierarchical relationships of earlier days. If recognised as such, these 
checks can enhance the visibility of the way power actually is being exercised: the 
decision making in a specific case becomes apparent, including the weighing of 
interests that takes place. Second, the decision makers involved can be held 
accountable.    
 
By thinking through the various foci/loci combinations, the ways in which democracy 
can match governance are turned into practical ‘solutions’. Some of them, like the 
suggestion of Van der Meer and Ham for the agricultural sector, may be innovative; 
others may regard a matter of making existing forces explicit, while others again, like 
enhancing the further professionalism of street-level bureaucrats, would imply further 
steps. Essential is that on the basis of the principles of the Rechtsstaat and democracy, 
the consequence of the replacement of government by governance, with the multi-
dimensional, mixed-focal character of the latter, would be that democracy can be 
conceptualised in a matching way, that is to say: multi-local. The multi-localisation of 
democracy than would mean, first, the acknowledgement of the empirical fact that 
often more participants are involved in certain sets of activities of governance than on 
normative grounds regarding the traditional democracy/government relationship 
would be expected. Second, making the variety of these actors, action levels, actions 
situations and administrative layers visible in specified contexts, can be seen as a 
precondition, not in the least for governance research. Third, new possibilities for 
holding public actors accountable may be detected. As far as accountability is 
concerned, these possibilities no longer exclusively are to be sought in the traditional 
centres of representative democracy. For the mixed-focal character of the concept of 
multiple governance also implies that direct participation of citizens and other not-
thus far-involved-parties in processes of public decision making not always is the only 
requisite that can be thought of. Apart from the probability that many contemporary 
citizens will get involved politically (in the narrow sense) again, co-direction on the 
layers of government now has got alternatives, particularly in the action level of 
constitutive governance. Following Van der Meer and Ham here, it no longer seems 
as much and only the intervention as such that counts, but the possibility of 
intervention becomes more important. The institutional design of democracy 
arrangements at the various spots in which governance is practised enables citizens 
and other not-permanently involved actors to engage in the making of decisions in the 
public domain at places and moments they deem relevant.   
 
 
5. Conclusions 
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That a democratic deficit is perceived in a context in which governance has become 
the dominant discourse about political-societal relationships appears to be not a 
coincidence. It is because in the stages ordering at a macro-level the linear linkages 
between Society and Public Performance at two points have become looser. First, 
between Society and Politics the primacy of the former has become the subject of 
pressure because of looser ties between citizens and institutions in general. This 
broken vertical connection is the cause of the democratic deficit in the narrow sense. 
Besides, the relationship between Politics and performance has become diffuse: this is 
addressed by the notion of the relocation of power. In the latter relationship the 
emergence of governance has produced problems of visibility and accountability. No 
longer is clear who is making the decisions underlying public performance, and on 
behalf of whom this happens. Essential here is the replacement of the hierarchy 
between democracy and government by the more horizontal pairing between 
democracy and governance. This same pairing, however, also offers a key to 
rethinking democracy as a variety of checks to the exercise of power; checks that, 
‘multi-localised’ as they are, can take various forms.     
 
As always contextualisation remains needed. In situations like the ones Creveld 
(1996) has pointed at, certain modes of governance, practised from certain action 
spots, are more appropriate than other ones. Unfortunately or not, the twelve years 
between the end of the Cold War till 9/11 when postmodernity flourished, are over. 
Governance may sometimes have to take the form of straightforward central control 
again. But also then, substantial powers behind that control are needed. Perhaps then 
even more, for great powers require great checks. Otherwise totalitarianism is lurking; 
and with that, indeed, the end of democracy. 
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